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ABSTRACT
Changes in trade policy, such as the formation of preferential trade agreements, can yield 
substantial benefits for the countries involved. Nevertheless, simple ex-ante predictions about 
changes in welfare from such trade reforms do not seem possible and, more importantly, even in 
the case of overall welfare gains, changes in welfare differ according to regions, sectors and 
across individuals. Certain groups will almost inevitably lose from trade reform. W ith respect to 
poverty the connection to trade reform is ambiguous. While trade could lead to poverty reduction 
via a positive impact on growth, trade reform will by no means automatically lead to poverty 
reduction. Therefore, trade liberalization policies should not be viewed as a reliable mechanism 
for generating self-sustaining growth and reducing poverty, let alone achieving other positive 
human development outcomes. Instead, it is deemed important to think about complementary 
policies in order to reduce poverty and the implementation of social safety nets to minimize 
adverse impacts of trade reform on certain population groups, in particular in the agricultural 
sector.
JEL Classification: F10, F15, I30
Keywords: trade liberalization, trade policy, welfare, poverty, NAFTA, CAFTA
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In May 2004 the United States signed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 1 
with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua, and later, in August 2004, 
the Dominican Republic was integrated into the agreement. Under CAFTA more than 80% of 
tariffs on US manufacturing exports and duties on over half of the value of US agricultural 
exports to the region will be eliminated immediately, with phase-out periods of up to 20 years for 
remaining tariffs. On the other hand, the agreement will improve upon and make permanent the 
trade benefits for Central America and the Dominican Republic allowed under various US 
programs, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and open the US market for several goods that 
were excluded or received limited preference under these programs. Moreover, the agreement 
improves upon regulatory transparency and establishes a secure and predictable legal 
environment for US investments into the region.
I. INTRODUCTION
BOX: US-CENTRAL AMERICA-DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Negotiations on an FTA between the US and Central America commenced in January 2003 and less than a year 
later, in December 2003, negotiations between the US and El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua were 
successfully completed. Meanwhile, negotiations with Costa Rica continued and negotiations were started with the 
Dominican Republic. In January 2004 the negotiations with Costa Rica were also successfully concluded, while 
negotiations with the Dominican Republic continued until April. The FTA between the United States and the 
Central American states was signed in May and in August the Dominican Republic was integrated into CAFTA. 
The agreement still needs to be ratified by US Congress and the legislatures of the Central American states and the 
Dominican Republic.
The structure of CAFTA is similar to other recent FTAs negotiated by the United States, such as the FTA 
between the United States and Chile in 2003, and covers issues ranging from market access, rules on investment and 
trade in services to intellectual property rights, labour standards and environmental protection. The aim of the treaty 
is to simplify and expand regional trade in goods and services and establish secure and predictable legal frameworks 
to promote US investment in the region.
In 2003, US merchandise exports to CAFTA countries were valued at $14.4 billion, while US imports from 
the region were valued at $16.7 billion. 80% of these imports, in particular textiles and apparel from the maquila- 
industry, already enter the United States duty-free either under Normal Trade Relations (NTR) rates or under one of 
the various US programmes, such as the US Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) or the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI).
1 Also referred to as US-CAFTA, DR-CAFTA or US-CA/DR FTA.
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Under CAFTA, the signing states agree to eliminate tariffs on originating goods under the agreed 
schedules. The immediate reciprocal tariff elimination under CAFTA will include 80% of tariffs on US 
merchandise exports to the region and the duties on over half o f the value of US agricultural exports. For the Central 
American states and the Dominican Republic, preferential trade treatment under the various US programmes will be 
made permanent and improved upon and tariffs on several goods not covered under these programmes will be
eliminated. Phase-out periods for remaining tariffs vary across sectors and last up to 20 years.
Duties on textiles and apparel that meet the rules of origin, as well as qualifying footwear, will be 
eliminated immediately. The US-quota on duty-free imports o f sugar will be doubled in the first year of the treaty, 
followed by an annual increase of 2%. Restrictive quotas on US corn and rice will be removed over a period of up 
to 20 years. With respect to trade in services, foreign providers will be guaranteed market access and national
treatment in many areas, particularly in telecommunications, insurance and banking services.
Several FTA safeguards are also included in the agreement, allowing sensitive sectors to be protected from 
import growth during the transition period. Special Agricultural Safeguards can be implemented when agreed upon 
import volumes are surpassed and are of particular importance for the Central American states to protect sensitive 
products, such as bovine meat, pig and chicken meat, rice and others.
Source: CEPAL (2004), Cordero (2004), USITC ( 2004).
The potential benefits from a free trade area (FTA) such as CAFTA are considerable. 
Traditional trade theory points to the gains from trade arising from the specialisation in 
production associated with inter-country differences in endowments and tastes, allowing 
countries to reap the benefits from their comparative advantages. New trade theory, in turn, draws 
attention to the gains from trade associated with the advantages of access to larger markets in the 
presence of increasing returns to scale. This access to larger markets could be particularly 
important for the Central American economies and the Dominican Republic, whose small 
domestic markets might not allow the low per-unit costs associated with large-scale production. 
Moreover, increased international competition could lead to efficiency gains associated with the 
elimination of monopoly losses, thereby further lowering costs. Finally, trade liberalization 
lowers the cost of imported capital inputs and gives more certainty with regard to trade, which 
could lead to increased investment and, hence, dynamic long-run gains.
The extent of these benefits, however, depends not only on the particular agreement and 
the characteristics o f the countries involved in the FTA, but also on the general circumstances in 
world trade. In particular, further multilateral or unilateral trade liberalisation and additional trade 
agreements by one of the FTA countries could dilute the benefits of the preferential market 
access granted by the FTA and thereby reduce its relative attractiveness. For example, the 
planned Free Trade Area o f the Americas (FTAA) could erode Central America’s preferential 
access to the US. Similarly, the planned global liberalisation o f textile and clothing quotas in 
2005 under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing of the Uruguay Round is expected to 
significantly reduce Latin America’s advantages o f preferential US trade policy and expose the 
region to the competition o f Asian low-cost producers, particularly China (IADB, 2004).
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Moreover, it needs to be recognised that the formation o f FTAs and the increased 
integration into world markets could also have negative side-effects, such as increased volatility 
and greater vulnerability to external shocks, as well as regional dependence and deterioration in 
the terms-of-trade. In addition, certain groups within the economy could suffer considerable 
hardship as a result o f tariff reductions, even in the case o f overall welfare gains from trade 
reform. For example, there may be substantial differences in terms o f welfare effects between 
men and women, or urban and rural workers. Hence, changes in developing countries’ trade 
policies could have negative social repercussions. In fact, the reduction o f trade barriers and the 
integration into world markets often directly impact on social outcomes such as poverty, and 
while the importance o f policies to moderate these impacts is widely recognized, social 
dimensions have still not been adequately integrated into most trade agreements (CEPAL, 2004).
Given the ambiguity o f trade outcomes and the disagreement over the benefits o f trade 
reform, this paper aims at giving an overview over the different welfare effects o f trade 
liberalisation. In particular, emphasis is put on individual vs. aggregate welfare and on the impact 
on poverty. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is taken as an example to 
illuminate some o f these linkages and possible lessons are drawn from its experience for CAFTA 
countries.
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II. AGGREGATE W ELFARE EFFECTS: TRADE CREATION  
VS. TRADE DIVERSION
The analysis based on Viner (1950) suggests that customs unions are welfare enhancing as long 
as the positive effects due to trade creation outweigh the negative ones caused by trade diversion. 
“The benefit o f a union to the union area as a whole derives from that portion o f new trade which 
is wholly new, whereas that portion of the new trade between members which is a substitute for 
trade with third countries must be regarded as a consequence o f the union which is injurious for 
the importing country, for the external world, and for the world as a whole, and is beneficial only 
to the supplying member country” (Viner, 1950). The net welfare effect is then assumed to 
depend on the relative importance of trade creation as opposed to trade diversion: “W here the 
trade-creating force is predominant, one of the members at least must benefit, both may benefit, 
the two countries combined must have a net benefit, and the world at large benefits. [...] W here 
the trade-diverting effect is predominant, one at least of the member countries is bound to be 
injured, both may be injured, the two combined will suffer a net injury, and there will be injury to 
the outside world and to the world at large.” (Viner, 1950). Hence, according to the basic 
Vinerian analysis of customs unions the creation of a preferential trade agreement will have 
positive welfare effects as long as trade creation is greater than trade diversion.
According to Viner (1950), a preferential trade agreement must meet the following three 
criteria to be classified as a customs union: “(1) the complete elimination o f tariffs as between the 
member territories; (2) the establishment o f a uniform tariff on imports from outside the union; 
(3) apportionment o f customs revenue between the members in accordance with an agreed 
formula” . Hence, FTAs such as NAFTA and the envisaged CAFTA are less restrictive, since the 
agreement only implies reduction or elimination o f tariffs for many products, i.e. only the first 
criterion applies while member states maintain different outside tariffs.
It is a common presumption in the discussion o f FTAs that the basic results from the 
Vinerian analysis of customs unions still apply to other forms of trade agreements, such as the 
FTAs analyzed in this study. This means that if  the benefits to a country arise because of 
increased trade, but only due to trade diversion, the gains may be eroded as:
• New  FTAs are signed with other countries that are more competitive than the own 
country, since the partners’ purchases may switch to this last entrant to the 
agreement, or if.
• The agreement is signed with countries which are less competitive than a third one 
outside the group, since the opportunity to get cheaper access to imports would be 
lost.
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BOX: TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION IN A SIMPLE 
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
The shifts between high- and low-cost produces as a result of free trade agreements can best be illustrated using a 
very simple numerical model (Lipsey, 1960). Assume three countries, A, B and C, which trade a single product, X.
The autarchy prices of good X in the three countries are assumed to be 35 in country A, 26 in B and 20 in 
C, respectively. Thus, country A is the high-cost producer and would, in the absence of any trade restrictions, 
import the good from country C.
However, with a 100% tariff imposed by country A, importing the good from B or C would then cost 52 
and 40, respectively, and country A would produce domestically. In this case, the formation of an FTA between A 
and B, but not with C, would imply costs for country A of 26 when importing from B and costs of 40 when 
importing from C. Hence, country A would import from B and the formation of the FTA between A and B would 
lead to trade creation and enhance welfare.
In contrast, with an initial tariff of 50%, and hence import costs of 39 and 30 from B and C, respectively, 
country A would import from country C rather than produce domestically. In this case, the formation of an FTA 
between A and B would again lead country A to import from B. However, this time it would be a shift of 
importing from country C, the low-cost producer, to importing from country B, a higher-cost producer. This would 
be a case of trade diversion, implying welfare losses for country A.
The key element o f the formation o f preferential trade agreements lies in the removal or 
reduction o f protective duties, i.e. duties which act to increase domestic production by reducing 
imports. With the reduction o f these duties there will be shifts in production. In particular, some 
products that were formerly produced domestically will be imported and some products that were 
formerly imported from non-union countries will be imported from a member country. W hile the 
former shifts constitute trade creation, the latter are referred to as trade diversion.
These shifts imply movements between high- and low-cost producers. In fact, “the 
prim ary purpose  o f a preferential trade agreement, and its major consequence for good or bad, is 
to shift sources o f supply, and the shift can be either to lower- or to higher-cost sources, 
depending on circumstances” (Viner, 1950; emphases added). While the shifts o f supply 
associated with trade creation entail movements from a high- to a low-cost producer, shifts 
associated with trade diversion are from lower to higher real cost sources o f supply. 2 These 
movements between high- and low-cost producers are the reason for the welfare effects of 
customs unions.
However, there are several theoretical problems associated with V iner's conclusion, 
owing to the restrictive implicit assumptions o f zero price elasticity o f demand and fixed real 
prices. Therefore, the resulting simple conclusions are only valid in special circumstances and 
“cannot be applied in most real-world situations” (Lipsey, 1970).
It is here implicitly assumed that tariffs before the formation of the union differed only 
between products but not between countries, i.e. before the preferential trade agreement the country in 
question acted on the principle of Normal Trade Relations (NTR) or Most Favoured Nation (MFN).
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In order to understand the effects o f FTA it needs to be acknowledged that the creation of 
these agreements will change consumption through price changes. According to Lipsey (1970), 
there are two sources o f prices changes: changes in real prices, i.e. those arising from changes in 
the terms-of-trade, and the fall in domestic prices following the reduction in tariffs when real 
prices are held constant. As a consequence, there will be changes in consumption, which can be 
divided in “inter-commodity substitution”, i.e. the substitution between different goods as a result 
o f changes in the relative price o f goods, and “inter-country substitution”, i.e. the substitution 
between countries in the purchase o f a given good.
W ith zero price elasticity of goods and given real prices the only form of inter-country 
substitution that is possible is then trade creation and trade diversion as described by Viner. 
However, goods are likely to have price elasticities greater than zero (in absolute value), leading 
to inter-commodity substitution even in the case of constant real prices. Thus, even if  a certain 
good is purchased before as well as after the creation of the FTA from the same member country, 
there can still be an increase in the volume o f trade in that good due to the substitution away from 
other goods purchased outside the union. For this reason, in the presence o f inter-commodity 
substitution there can be no clear presumption that trade diversion is welfare-reducing. Moreover, 
if  changes in real prices are also taken into consideration it becomes impossible to make a-priori 
predictions about the welfare outcome o f a FTA. As Lipsey (1970) points out, the study of 
customs unions or FTA in general equilibrium models illustrates “the extreme complexity of 
customs unions in general equilibrium settings and, thus, the extreme difficulty of a priori 
reasoning about the possible effects o f these unions” . 3
Also, as pointed out by M eade (1955), the volumes o f trade that are created or diverted 
are not sufficient to determine whether a union will be welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing, 
since the final welfare effect depends also on the extent of cost reduction due to trade creation 
and cost increases due to trade diversion. Moreover, following Lipsey (1970), the analysis of 
customs unions or FTA should be made within a general equilibrium framework since the 
creation of there trade areas involve several large tariff changes, which renders the ceteris paribus 
assumption, and hence any partial equilibrium analyses, incorrect. In fact, the issue of customs 
unions can be seen as a particular case of the theory of second best, which implies that no simple 
conclusions about welfare effects from trade creation and trade diversion can be drawn.
Therefore, no simple a priori predictions about the welfare effects of customs unions or 
preferential trade agreements seem possible. Rather, the final welfare effect of such changes in 
trade policy seems to be an empirical question where each case has to be looked at individually. 
In the following, a number o f studies on welfare effects o f NAFTA and CAFTA are discussed.
Krueger (1999) claims that the changes in trade flows after NAFTA do not give much 
support to the view that NAFTA was trade-diverting. She points out that between 1992 and 1998 
M exico gained four percentage points in the share o f total US imports while East Asia lost 2.5%. 
However, after 1994 M exico was in fact gaining share not only in the US but also in the rest of 
the world. She also analyses gravity equations o f trade, i.e. estimations o f the determinants of 
trade, and examines the shifts therein as a consequence of NAFTA and finds “little evidence of 
major alterations o f trade patters as a result o f preferential trade arrangements” (Krueger, 1999).
For a survey on welfare effects of customs unions see Panagariya (2000).
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In fact, M exico’s exports to the US grew most in those commodity groups in which exports to the 
rest o f the world also increased most, providing evidence against the view that the increase in 
Mexican-US trade was trade-diverting.
This is consistent with the analysis made by Moreno-Brid, Ruiz and Rivas (2005) who 
show that Mexico went into unilateral trade liberalization and foreign investment deregulation 
since the 80’. The NAFTA in the 90’ served the purpose o f institutionalizing this global reform 
process. “NAFTA greatly facilitated M exico’s liberalizing goals, allowing M exico to become a 
dynamic player in export o f non-oil products and to insert itself into global markets” . And also 
“A remarkable trait in the M exican transition to trade liberalization was the lack o f drastic 
reallocating processes in capital and labour within the manufacturing industry. To a certain 
extent, the trade patterns and industrial composition after NAFTA do not radically differ from its 
previous tendencies.. .Curiously enough, some o f the most successful exporting sectors have their 
roots in the import-substituting era and the sector-specific promotion policies implemented 
during that time” .
In contrast, Fukao, Okubo and Stern (2002) find in their econometric trade flow analysis 
evidence o f considerable trade-diversion, using data at a more disaggregated level. In particular, 
they find evidence o f trade diversion in US imports o f textiles and apparel at the expense of 
Asian suppliers. Similarly, Romalis (2004) finds that NAFTA has had a substantial impact on 
international trade and claims that there is strong evidence o f trade-diversion as a result of 
NAFTA.
However, as also pointed out by Krueger (1999), the basic problem with empirical 
analyses o f trade creation and diversion is to separate the effects o f trade reform from other 
macroeconomic shocks. In fact, in the case o f Mexico, the real appreciation o f the M exican peso 
between 1987 and 1994 and the following sharp depreciation during the peso crisis in 1994/5, as 
well as M exico’s unilateral tariff-dismantling in the late-1980s, appear to have been more 
important in determining trade patterns than NAFTA.
In sum, there appears to exist some evidence o f trade diversion in the case o f NAFTA. 
This was principally a move on part o f the US to import from M exico rather than from non- 
NAFTA members, especially those in Asia. However, despite the possibility o f trade diversion 
away from non-NAFTA members, or rather because o f this trade diversion, there seems to be no 
evidence o f overall welfare losses to Mexico as a result o f the free trade area with the US and 
Canada. This would support the case for Central A merica’s decision to establish a similar free 
trade agreement with the US.
In fact, for CAFTA a number o f ex-ante studies on trade creation, trade diversion and 
welfare effects based on computable general equilibrium (CGE) simulations point to potential 
welfare gains for the Central American countries, the Dominican Republic and the US.
Hilaire and Yang (2003) use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model to analyse 
the effects o f several different FTAs in which the US are engaged. Their simulations for CAFTA 
show important welfare gains for the Central American countries. In fact, GDP in the region 
could increase by as much as 1.5% under CAFTA. The main source o f the welfare gain for 
CAFTA countries would come from the expansion o f textile, clothing and processed crop exports
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to the US. There would also be some trade creation, as basic manufacturing imports from the US 
would supplant CAFTA countries’ own production.
In a similar study, Brown, Kiyota and Stern (2004) simulate the potential impacts o f an 
FTA between the US and Central American and the Caribbean (CAC). 4 In their study, which 
incorporates aspects o f imperfect competition from new trade theory, the bilateral removal of 
tariffs would lead to an even greater welfare gain for Central America. They estimate that welfare 
in the CAC would increase by $2.7 billion due to the elimination o f manufacturing tariffs and 
$1.9 billion due to the elimination o f service barriers. The total improvement in welfare would 
represent 3.8% of GNP. While they also find some evidence o f trade diversion for non-CAC 
countries, welfare losses associated with this trade diversion are estimated to be small.
W elfare benefits to the US, in turn, are estimated to be small, owing to the small market 
size o f the Central American region relative to the US. In fact, the effects o f CAFTA on US 
sectorial output and employment are estimated to be comparatively negligible. According to 
Brown, Kiyota and Stern (2004), US economic welfare will be increased by $3.9 billion as a 
result o f the elimination o f manufacturing tariffs and $13.5 billion as a result o f the bilateral 
elimination o f service barriers. The combined improvement would however represent only 0.17% 
of US GNP. In a similar study, the USITC (2004) estimates even smaller welfare benefits for the 
US o f around $166 million, or less than 0.01% of US GNP.
It should, however, be emphasised that these CGE studies only model the effects o f the 
removal o f trade barriers. Therefore, the estimates should be taken as lower bounds o f welfare 
benefits as the non-trade aspects o f the agreements could mean additional benefits for all 
countries involved.
In conclusion, the ex-post NAFTA studies as well as the ex-ante CAFTA simulations 
appear to suggest that CAFTA could lead to some trade diversion but a net welfare benefit. In 
particular for the CAFTA countries, aggregate welfare gains could be substantial as a percentage 
of GDP.
However, the above discussion and outlined empirical studies are only concerned with 
changes in aggregate welfare. In fact, intra-country welfare effects could differ substantially 
according to region or sector. Thus, the finding that CAFTA could infer sizable welfare benefits 
on the Central American countries does not reveal much about the effects on individual industries 
or population groups within these countries. In order to shed some light on these disaggregated 
welfare effects, the winners and losers o f trade reforms need to be identified.
4 The inclusion of the non-CAFTA countries in the study was a result of data limitation. 
However, according to the authors, results for CAFTA would only be slightly different given that most of 
the trade share between the CAC and the US is due to the trade between CAFTA countries and the US. 
Hence, the CAC countries can be taken as a reasonable proxy for CAFTA countries.
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III. W INNERS AND LOSERS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION
1. Theories that explain welfare impacts from trade liberalization
Looking at the welfare effects of trade liberalisation at a more disaggregated level, different 
models can be used to illustrate the differential impact that trade liberalisation can have at the 
sectorial or individual level. The most common models that show the emergence of winners and 
losers o f changes in trade policy are versions of the simple Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model 
(HOS).
According to HOS, which builds on the classical supply-side theories, differences in 
countries’ factor endowments give rise to mutually beneficial trade, which raises each trading 
partner’s total welfare. In particular, a country will specialise (though not completely) in the 
production of goods whose production is relatively intensive in the factor with which that country 
is relatively well endowed. W ithin the commonly used 2x2x2 model (two countries, two final 
goods and two factors o f production) it can then be shown (Samuelson, 1949) that countries’ 
factor prices will eventually become the same, conditional on the equalisation of final goods 
prices under perfectly free international trade. This finding, known as the factor price equalisation 
(FPE) theorem, predicts that the returns to a country’s abundant factor will rise as a result of 
international trade while those to the scarce factor will fall. Consequently, those factors of 
production employed in the production of exported good will gain as a result of trade 
liberalisation, while those factors employed in the import competing industries will lose.
The two factors of production that are usually looked at in empirical applications of this 
simple model are capital and labour or, alternatively, skilled and unskilled labour. Applying this 
model to the formation of a preferential trade area between the US and a developing country, one 
would expect labour (in the case of labour and capital) or unskilled labour (in the case of skilled 
and unskilled labour) to result as the winner in the developing country, presuming that 
developing countries are relatively abundant in (unskilled) labour.
Moreover, certain predictions about employment effects could be deducted. Although the 
model assumes full employment at all times since factor rewards adjust to clear markets, shifts of 
factors between different sectors of the economy are predicted. Hence, in the presence of labour 
market imperfections short-term unemployment could result from opening up to world markets. 
The greater the labour market imperfections are, the longer these adjustments could take, and the 
greater would be the associated adjustment costs. In particular, if  there is hysteresis in 
unemployment, for example due to loss of skills, short-term unemployment due to the 
reallocation of labour between industries could turn into long-term unemployment. If  the new 
reallocation is not attained soon enough, not only skills may be eroded and equipment may 
become obsolete, but trade imbalances may emerge and government revenues may fall (Akyüz, 
2005).
The predictions of the model rely on several assumptions whose violation could 
significantly alter the behaviour o f factor prices. For example, the presence o f scale economies,
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i.e. a violation o f the constant returns to scale assumption, could invalidate the FPE theorem by 
offsetting the negative effect on the scarce factor through a rise in both factors’ marginal product, 
causing both factors’ returns to rise (Bhagwati and Dehejia, 1994). A violation o f the no-factor- 
intensity-reversal assumption, or simply an extension o f the model to include four instead o f two 
goods, can also alter factor prices, which could then actually diverge as a result o f trade reform 
even in the face o f convergence o f final goods prices (Deardorff, 1986).
The model is thus rather restrictive in its assumptions. In fact, Baghwati and Dehejia 
(1994) state that the assumptions underlying the FPE theorem are “extraordinarily demanding”, 
leading them to conclude that “few would find the theorem compelling as a guide to thinking 
about the real world if  only they were familiar with these assumptions” . In fact, at an empirical 
level the HOS model performs rather poorly, “hopelessly inadequate as an explanation for 
historical or modern trade patterns” (Feenstra, 2004).
Given such weaknesses o f the simple HOS model, other channels should also be 
considered through which trade could produce winners and losers. For example, factors of 
production could also be affected differently through the effect o f skill-biased technological 
transfers. Increases in foreign direct investment and greater cooperation at the firm-level, both of 
which are often associated with the creation o f FTAs, can lead to significant technology transfers. 
W hen these technological transfers are skill-biased, increased demand for capital instead of 
labour and for skilled instead o f unskilled labour could be the result. Hence, despite being the 
relatively abundant factor in a developing country, unskilled labour could lose as a result o f trade 
reform.
An alternative view is the “Australian M odel” that applies to small open economies. 5 
This is a model incorporates a distinction between tradable and no tradable and the real exchange 
rate. Oslington (2001) extends the literature on this subject by developing a general equilibrium 
trade version o f the model. He measures welfare using the trade indirect utility function for the 
representative individual, which depends on the prices o f the goods consumes and the income of 
the consumers. Further, the author considers unemployment is generated by a minimum wage to 
all industries, but that is only binding in the lowest productive sector producing the import 
competing good. This restriction may be due to social security reasons. This model can be 
adapted to the region by saying that there are two factors o f production: skilled and unskilled 
labour, which produces: a) a high productivity good for export, in the first case, and b) a low 
productivity good for the internal market. This last product, b, is not competitive for export and, 
in fact, it is also import competing. The wage restriction may be reinterpreted as a subsistence 
income, for example in rural areas, or alternatively as the poverty line.
Conclusions may hold in this adaptation when the model predicts that an increase in the 
relative price o f the exporting good, or relative decrease o f the imported good, for example 
through lowering tariffs, will also increase the price for good b, if  this sector employs at least 
some o f skilled labour. This would mean that it is important for the non traded goods, or the 
import competing sectors to lift productivity levels so as to profit from the gains from trade that 
would come through the change in factor prices. Anyway, if  the increase in the price for the
5 This model is based on the original ideas of Wilson, Swan and Salter, with other 
contributions by Dornbush and Neary, among others.
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exported good is higher than for good b, then it could be possible that the demand for good b 
falls. This is also because the imported good becomes cheaper. This would explain the difficulties 
in rural areas to keep their traditional way o f production. As long as labour can migrate to other 
sectors, or attain the qualifications to enter the higher productivity sector, poverty will not 
increase.
W elfare increases may be accompanies by identifiable losers. This may happen when 
tariff cuts offer good b at a lower price for consumption, and may also increase production of 
good a, but at the same time the import competing industry may decrease. This model also 
predicts increase o f welfare if  the endowment o f high productive factor increases, if  there is no 
unemployment for it. But is the model is interpreted differently, conclusions may differ. I f  the 
minimum wage is applied to the most dynamic sector, while the non tradable has a lower income, 
then unemployment may appear in the first one. Other forms o f market segmentation may cause 
the same effect, i.e. unemployment, like the presence o f barriers o f entry from one sector to 
another, being qualification a characteristic that may keep some workers away from the fastest 
growing sectors.
Another view may also offer some help to understand the process. The dual model based 
on Harris Todaro, shows that unemployment will be generated in a growing sector if  there is a 
large enough pool o f low-wage low-productivity workers seeking higher incomes in the fist 
sector. But this would only happen in case the import competing sector reduces its employment 
level. I f  unemployment is not generated, because none o f the industries are reducing their sales 
level, but anyway the dynamic sector increases wages, the least productive sector will press this 
new wage gap down, unless there are barriers to entry to the high wages sector. If  this happens, 
employment would grow in this new dynamic sector, and also productivity, but wages will stay 
low. This may be the case o f export oriented industries, as maquila. This is because there is a 
pool o f workers whose cost o f opportunity, or alternative income, is not higher than the wage 
paid. So, dualism will be a problem in any case. This idea makes it necessary for governments to 
implement policies that would increase the opportunity costs o f low skilled population s that the 
gap between the high productive and the low productive sector disappears.
One important matter to ensure welfare gains is that industrialization is not threatened by 
any FTA. Akyüz (2005) says that industrialization is a necessary step towards a continuous 
growth path (because greater productivity growth and more feasible expansion o f production than 
with agricultural-based economy). According to his view, the early stages o f industrialization are 
characterized by sectorial specialization in exploiting endowments o f natural resources and 
unskilled labour. Central America seems to be at this stage. 6 These industries do not usually 
need heavy protection, but more skill and technology intensive new industries may need 
promotion in some way. He argues that some tools used by already developed countries in their 
early stages o f industrialization may now be unavailable to developing countries because o f 
multilateral commitments to WTO, like agreements on subsidies, TRIMS and TRIPS. Making 
commitments on tariffs based in the present industrialization stage may reduce flexibility in the
6 A further level is a “diversification into a wide spectrum of technologically more advanced 
activities, accompanies by increased internal integration through a dense set of linkages among sectors”. 
The most developed nations can have again a sectorial specialization, but this time “at the top end of the 
technology ladder”.
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future. This is why his suggestion is that a country needs to keep open the opportunity to use 
industrial and commercial tools if  it desires to enter any new industry and develop it to 
international levels of productivity. Negotiation over an average tariff instead of undertaking 
obligation for a line-by-line reduction could be an option.
In conclusion, it is evident that trade reform will impact differently on the various sectors 
and groups o f an economy. In several theories, the factors market is the main transmission 
mechanism from the trade policies to welfare, particularly through the labour market. Thus, there 
may be distributional impacts o f trade liberalisation. However, these distributional impacts 
remain ambiguous and the different mechanisms that cause some groups to gain and others to 
lose may work in opposite directions. Therefore, the ultimate distributional impact depends on 
the specific country characteristics and is a question that needs to be answered not only 
theoretically, but also empirically for each individual country.
In order to shed some light on the winner-loser effects of changes in trade policy, the 
experience o f NAFTA and ex-ante studies on CAFTA are examined with respect to changes in 
wages, employment and the income distribution to see if  any o f the theories analyzed explains the 
phenomenon and would help to understand possible outcomes for the CAFTA countries.
2. Empirical evidence
In Mexico, average manufacturing wages have been stagnant or falling since the onset of trade 
reform, contrary to what a simple HOS model with labour and capital as factors o f production 
might suggest. As pointed out by Dussel (2004) real wages in manufacturing in 2003 were only 
84% o f their 1980-level. M oreover, the employment generated in the export-intensive branches 
o f the economy is associated with “real wages that have a downward tendency with respect to the 
rest o f the economy during 1988-2001” (Dussel, 2004).
A much discussed topic with respect to M exican wages and one of the most examined 
cases o f applications o f the HOS model is the development o f skilled relative to unskilled wages 
in the aftermath o f M exico’s export-orientation. The empirical evidence shows that the reduction 
o f tariffs led to a rise in the relative wage of skilled workers, again contradicting the predictions 
o f the HOS model under the presumption that M exico is relatively abundant in unskilled labour. 
Several studies (Revenga, 1997; Harrison and Hanson, 1999; Hanson, 2003; Nicita, 2004; Morley 
and Diaz-Bonilla, 2004) have found that skilled workers have benefited relatively more from 
trade liberalisation and that the wages o f unskilled workers have fallen in many regions. 
According to Harrison and Hanson (1999) wage inequality had been declining prior to trade 
reform, but rose dramatically after 1985. While this appears to contradict the HOS model, they 
argue that it is in fact consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem of factor price equalisation, 
since the most protected sectors prior to 1985 were those intensive in the use o f unskilled labour. 
However, they also mention the possibility of outsourcing, skill-biased technological change, 
falling minimum wages and the decline in union strength as possible contributing reasons for the 
change in the wage structure. Moreover, Hanson (2003) claims that M exico’s comparative 
advantage in low-skill activities was actually lower than expected and assembly operations 
associated with the maquila industry were skill-intensive relative to other M exican manufacturing 
plants.
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An issue closely related to the development o f wages is that o f productivity growth. While 
highly export-oriented sectors could increase their productivity growth since the 1980s, and 
thereby their competitiveness, productivity growth in the manufacturing sector as a whole 
remained unchanged and even declined for the economy as a whole (Palma, 2003). Therefore, it 
might be suspected that the disappointing development o f real wages could be attributed to low 
productivity growth.
However, low productivity growth is unlikely to have caused the poor wage performance, 
given that even sectors with very high productivity growth did not see any substantial 
improvement in their wages. Real wages in the dynamic maquila sector increased by only 10% 
between 1990 and 2003, while productivity increased by more than 115% (Dussel 2004). In 
consequence, a gap opened up between real wages and productivity. In fact, this wage- 
productivity gap was particularly pronounced in those sectors o f the economy that opened up to 
trade and became export-oriented. As a result o f these developments, the share o f wages in GDP 
fell dramatically and Samuelson’s theorem o f trade-related wage-equalisation across countries 
(leading to an upward adjustment in the low-wage DC) was not even close to reality (Palma, 
2003).
On the other hand, it is difficult to disentangle the effects o f trade liberalisation on wages 
from the effects o f other macroeconomic adjustments, shocks and institutional changes. In 
particular, M exican labour market institutions have been biased against wage increases (Polaski, 
2003). This institutional bias against wage increases becomes evident in the development of 
minimum wages, which are politically fixed and represent an important reference point for 
collective wage bargaining. Between 1980 and 2003 minimum wages lost 30% of their real 
value. Moreover, the two crises in 1982 and 1994/5 led to major wage declines. Finally, the 
stagnation-decline in wages began already in 1976, long before the onset o f trade liberalisation 
and in the midst o f M exico’s oil boom (Palma, 2003), pointing to institutional rather than just 
trade related reasons for the decline in wages.
W ith respect to employment, the NAFTA experience has been similarly disappointing. 
The net gain in employment as a result o f NAFTA has been very small and the jobs that have 
been created in export-oriented manufacturing firms have hardly kept up with the loss of 
employment in agriculture. According to Polaski (2003), 30% of the jobs that were created in the 
maquila industry have already disappeared since then, so that in 2003 the maquila industry 
employed roughly 550,000 more workers than before NAFTA. The increase o f non-maquila jobs 
as a result o f exports to the US are approximately 450,000. However, at the same time 
agricultural employment has fallen by 1.3 million, partly as a result o f increased agricultural 
imports. Consequently, “the reservoir o f low-wage low-productivity workers shows no sign of 
being absorbed by M exico’s export sector in the foreseeable future” (Polaski, 2003). As a result 
o f this development the informal sector has grown significantly in recent years. In fact, only 
31.09% of the increase in the economically active population was absorbed by an increase in 
formal employment between 1991 and 2003, translating into informal employment growth and/or 
migration to the US (Dussel, 2004).
This poor development o f M exican post-NAFTA employment could at least partially be 
attributed to the effects o f trade reform, given that the “process o f trade liberalisation coincides 
with a deterioration in the generation o f employment and its quality” (Dussel, 2004). Many
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export-oriented sectors lack backward-linkages with the rest o f the economy and the agricultural 
sector experienced a significant reduction o f employment associated with greater imports. 
Moreover, the reduction o f tariff barriers has lowered the cost o f capital inputs and induced a 
substitution o f capital for labour (CEPAL, 2004). However, other factors such as the effect of 
large-scale privatisations o f public companies and the greater participation o f women in the 
labour force also need to be considered and, according to Hanson (2003), part o f the decline in 
agricultural employment can also be explained by the reform o f the land tenure system and the 
break-up o f rural cooperatives.
Notwithstanding the difficulty o f disentangling trade effects from other economic and 
political developments, it appears that the opening up o f trade has not benefited everyone in 
Mexico. Rather, trade liberalisation has produced losers as well as winners and has consequently 
had distributional impacts. According to Nicita (2004) trade liberalisation has increased 
inequality “between the south and the north o f the country, urban and rural areas, and the skilled 
and unskilled labour” . In the 1990s the top-10% of households have increased their share of 
national income while the other 90% have lost income share or seen no change (Polaski, 2003).
Palma (2003) points out those workers -  no matter how skilled they are -  will hardly be 
found at the very top end o f the distribution o f income. Therefore, even if  trade liberalisation can 
be held responsible for the introduction o f new techniques o f production with ‘asymmetrical 
labour demand’ [...] this factor alone is very unlikely to account for a significant amount o f the 
region’s huge income inequality” . Similarly, Vos, Ganuza and Morley (2004) claim that in Latin 
America trade liberalisation was not the cause for the rising inequality. Yet in general, it seems 
justified to say that that the asymmetric liberalisation o f markets, i.e. opening up the trade in 
goods and capital and at the same time keeping the movement o f labour restricted, benefits the 
more mobile factors o f production, i.e. capital and skilled labour, and harms those whose 
mobility is restricted (CEPAL, 2004).
In conclusion, the study o f NAFTA shows that reform will produce not only winners but 
also losers and that aggregate welfare gains can hide important losses at the individual level. In 
Mexico, it appears, skilled workers and capital owners gained relatively more from the opening 
up to trade than did unskilled workers and, especially, agricultural households.
In Central America similar winner-loser effects are expected from CAFTA. Brown, 
Kiyota and Stern (2004) predict significant increases in employment in Central America in 
textiles (47,887 jobs, which represents an employment increase o f 27% in the sector), wearing 
apparel (225,091; 43%) and leather products & footwear (7,915; 13%). However, they estimate 
that at the same time jobs will be lost in all other sectors, since the expansion o f the labour­
intensive sectors with employment growth will attract workers from other sectors o f the 
economy. Thus, there will be substantial adjustment costs associated with employment 
reallocation and worker displacement.
A series o f CGE counterfactual simulations o f different trade liberalisation scenarios in 
Latin America also show that the gains o f trade in Central American countries would be spread 
unequally. For example, Sauma and Sanchez (2004) find that further trade liberalisation in 
Costa Rica would lead to an overall increase in incomes and employment, but also increased
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income inequality and particular losses o f employment and income for agricultural workers. In 
general, these simulations emphasise that the gains from trade will not be equally spread.
Sánchez (2005) computes a similar CGE model which simulates the changes in the 
economic structure and employment after 1997, which is the base year. He simulates 
liberalization, and compares it to the real liberalization occurred in the region since that year. Ha 
also combines this simulation process it with two other effects: a) external shocks on foreign 
saving, remittances and a loss in terms of trade, all which bring about currency appreciation; and
b) nominal depreciation. He shows that in the first case El Salvador is hurt in its export industries 
and turns out to be a services economy. The "dollarization” occurred prevented from exchange 
rate from going down too much due to the external shocks in a). Also, when simulating a nominal 
depreciation, El Salvador is not able to grow led by exports. This also happens in Honduras, and 
this effect even larger in this country, may be because of low diversification and productivity in 
agriculture. His conclusion for Honduras is that any policy that affects non tradable goods and 
services, even if  promoting exports, may affect growth. For Costa Rica, the agricultural sector is 
the key element for export led growth, which is more diversified and productive than in the other 
countries. The FDI received had to be compensated by small depreciations in its exchange rate. It 
is important to note that this is the only one, among the three, where exports can outweigh 
imports in the simulation with liberalization and no external shocks. The other countries will 
show an increased commercial deficit. As it was said, this study simulates the effects of the 
liberalization from 1997 onwards, and not the CAFTA itself, so care should be taken to extend 
these conclusions to the special case o f FTA with United States.
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IV. POVERTY IM PACTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION
W age impacts and changes in employment due to trade liberalisation can have serious social 
consequences in the affected countries. In particular, adverse income changes due to trade reform 
can be sufficient to push individuals under the poverty line. Moreover, if  poverty traps are 
present, short-term adjustment costs, for example in terms o f temporary unemployment, could 
have serious long-term consequences in terms o f poverty. On the other hand, positive impacts 
from trade reform could lift people out o f poverty and lead to significant poverty reductions.
In general, the link between changes in trade policy and poverty is made via the impact of 
trade on growth, especially when looking at the long-term relationship. This link refers to the 
‘lifting-all-boats’-idea that trade reform will lead to higher growth, which will eventually increase 
everyone’s income and thereby reduce poverty. However, this connection depends firstly on the 
effectiveness o f trade reform in enhancing economic growth, and secondly on the effectiveness of 
economic growth in reducing poverty. In the following, these two links are examined.
The connection between trade reform and growth is based on the view that trade leads to 
specialisation, allocative efficiency and fuller utilisation o f countries’ endowments. However, 
while economic theory is rather clear about the positive potential that trade can have for growth, 7 
the empirical evidence is more ambiguous. A study o f the UNDP (2003) compares the 
experiences o f Viet Nam and Haiti to make this point. W hile Viet Nam, which is not a WTO 
member, has taken a gradual approach to economic reform, following a two-track programme 
with state trading, import monopolies and high tariffs, Haiti undertook comprehensive trade 
liberalisation in the mid-90s and became a member o f the WTO. Yet, Viet Nam has achieved 
high annual growth rates o f over 8% and sharply reduced poverty, while H aiti’s economy has 
stagnated and not made any progress in the reduction o f poverty.
On the other hand, various studies on the trade-growth nexus using large samples of 
countries find positive relationships between the two. For example, Dollar and Kraay (2001) 
classify countries into globalisers and non-globalisers based on their post-1980 trade growth and 
find that globalisers have higher growth rates, pointing towards a positive trade-growth 
connection. However, their approach has been criticised on the grounds that trade growth is the 
outcome o f many factors, including an economy’s overall economic performance, and hence a 
bad proxy for changes in trade policy (UNDP, 2003). In contrast, there is no systematic 
relationship between direct measures o f trade policy, such as average tariff and non-tariff 
measures, and subsequent economic growth; rather, the only systematic relationship that the 
evidence shows is that all countries reduce trade barriers as they get richer (UNDP, 2003). This 
accounts for the fact that today’s industrialised countries developed in fact behind tariff barriers 
and opened up to trade in later stages o f development (Chang, 2002).
7 Despite the numerous theoretical arguments on how openness can promote growth, economic 
theory also points to possible circumstances in which increased openness might harm growth, e.g. in the 
presence of infant-industries.
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These studies are just some examples o f the vast empirical literature on the trade-growth 
nexus, which essentially deals with the right choice o f data and methodology. Eminent papers in 
this debate are those by D ollar (1992), Sachs and W arner (1995) and Edwards (1998), all 
claiming to have found evidence o f a positive relationship between trade and growth, and the 
paper by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) questioning the methodology and data o f the 
aforementioned studies.
D ollar’s (1992) analysis, one o f the most heavily cited papers on the issue, is based on the 
relationship between growth and indices o f real exchange rate distortions and real exchange rate 
variability, which are used as indices o f outward orientation, or rather o f the lack o f it, since 
outward orientation should in theory lead to stable and undistorted real exchange rates. Finding a 
significant negative sign for both these variables, he concludes that there is a positive relationship 
between trade and growth. Sachs and W arner (1995), on the other hand, run cross-country 
regressions o f growth performance on a number o f variables, including a binary variable whether 
a country is open or closed according to their criteria, and find a significant positive influence o f 
trade openness on growth. Finally, Edwards (1998) uses cross-country regressions to test the 
influence o f trade policy on total factor productivity growth, using different indices o f openness 
to trade. He finds a significant positive relationship between openness and productivity growth.
However, all o f these papers have been subject to criticism. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) 
examine the mentioned studies and argue that many o f the results are not robust to the inclusion 
o f standard control variables, a result which appears common in the critique o f empirical growth 
studies, and question the theoretical and econometric methodology o f the authors. Moreover, they 
criticise the choice o f data, in particular the use o f the different measures o f openness. They 
conclude that the results do not stand up to close scrutiny and that “the issue [of the link between 
openness and growth] is far from settled on empirical grounds” . 8
In sum, there appears to be no clear empirical evidence o f a positive link between 
openness to trade and higher growth. In fact, the link is likely to be country-specific and “cross­
country econometric studies [. ] typically are not very enlightening about the mechanisms by 
which trade liberalisation and export promotion affect growth” (Vos, Ganuza, Morley, 2004). 
However, presuming a positive relationship between openness and growth, a positive connection 
between increased openness and poverty reduction still requires a negative relationship between 
economic growth and poverty.
Several economists agree on this negative relationship and see economic growth as a 
precondition for sustained poverty alleviation. Still, this is a deep field in which agreement has 
not been made yet. Cline (2004) states that “ultimately it is economic growth that will be the 
major engine that lifts hundreds o f millions out o f poverty” . Yet, the strength o f the link between 
growth and poverty crucially hinges upon the growth elasticity o f poverty, i.e. how responsive 
poverty is to changes in growth, which in turn depends on the distributional structure o f the
8 For a survey of the issues involved in the trade-growth-poverty link see also Berg and 
Krueger (2003).
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economy. 9 The growth elasticity o f poverty is lower where inequality is greater, so additional 
growth in unequal countries lowers poverty less than in more egalitarian ones.
Ravallion (2001) tries to explain why there can be opposite conclusions when analyzing 
the effect of growth on the poor. He tests that growth does dot affect inequality on average. That 
means that any growth will be enjoyed disproportionately by the richer than by the poorer groups. 
Anyway, this would mean that the poor will have at least a minimum share of the gains from 
growth. So, growth would be poverty reducing. He calculates the “growth elasticity” o f poverty, 
which seems greater than 1, i.e. for every 1% growth, poverty will be reduced more that 1%. This 
happens on averages, but when looking beyond averages, things may be different. The coefficient 
o f the elasticity estimation has a confidence level, which means that the real value can be higher 
or lower than that average value. In fact, it may be true that poverty can increase in some 
countries if  growth is not equitable. But this is not enough to say that poverty would have been 
reduced faster if  certain country’s growth was more equitable because growth could have been 
lower if  inequality did not rise. This relates to the old theory o f Kuznetz, where growth, at lower 
per capita values is usually accompanied by rising inequality. There has been a lot o f empirical 
work on this issue. The inverted U  shape seems to be due only to the fact that many studies use 
cross section information where Latin American high-inequality middle-income countries are 
considered among low-inequality low-income and low-inequality high-income countries. But the 
author then concentrates in the relationship between the elasticity and the initial level of 
inequality in a growth process. He argues that when inequality is high, the poor will tend to share 
less o f the growth because poverty is reduced less if  initial inequality is high.
The importance of changes in inequality in this respect is also highlighted in a study by 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-ECLAC), 
which emphasises the importance of reductions in inequality for poverty reduction: a “one- or 
two-point reduction in the Gini coefficient would achieve the same reduction in the incidence of 
poverty as many years of positive economic growth” (CEPAL, 2002). In fact, they claim that the 
reason for the disappointing results of recent poverty reduction efforts in Latin America is that 
the high levels o f inequality in the region are highly intractable. Bussolo et al (2003) also state 
that poverty elasticities of growth are very low in Mexico, “mainly due to the fact that Latin 
America is a region with high levels of inequality” .
The remaining question is therefore whether changes in trade policy significantly affect 
the income distribution and, thereby, the effectiveness of growth to reduce poverty. For a cross­
section o f countries, D ollar and Kraay (2001) do not find any significant relationship between 
openness to trade and changes in incomes shares, but the find a positive relationship between 
poverty reduction and growth. So they conclude that trade will reduce poverty. Similarly, 
McCulloch, W inters and Cirera (2001) claim that trade reform does not affect the income 
distribution in a systematically adverse way.
The studies presented here may suggest that even if  openness may not change inequality, 
the high level o f inequality may prevent the poor from profiting from the gains from trade. 
However, given the absence of clear empirical evidence on the trade-growth-poverty nexus, it is
9 The link between poverty and growth is the subject of a vast economic literature on pro-poor 
growth. For an overview see, for example, Ravallion (2004).
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important to understand and analyse the individual transmission channels through which changes 
in trade reform can affect individual welfare and, hence, poverty. W inters (2000) and McCulloch, 
W inters and Cirera (2001) give detailed account o f these channels and Nicita (2004) emphasises 
the importance o f tracing these channels in empirical work.
The analyses by W inters (2000) and M cCulloch et al (2001) are based on the farm- 
household model and examine the impact o f trade reform on the incomes and expenditures that 
households face. The three broad channels identified, which are described in more detail in the 
following, are:
• The impact o f trade liberalisation on goods prices,
• The impact on profits and hence on employment and wages, and
• The impact on the government’s fiscal position.
Changes in tariff and non-tariff barriers will directly impact on domestic prices. In fact,
large scale trade reforms such as FTAs will result in large changes o f many prices at once. 
However, how the changes in border prices translate into changes in prices faced by households 
depends on the competitive structure, the operation o f government institutions and market 
organisations and the extent o f the domain o f trade. Moreover, there will be indirect price effects 
even in markets o f goods that have not been liberalised since the substitution between goods will 
have second-round effects. The response o f households to these price changes will depend on 
households’ ability to adjust to these prices, such as households’ assets and the availability of 
substitutes o f goods whose prices have risen. The total effect o f price changes on households’ 
welfare, and hence poverty, will then depend on whether the household is a net supplier or 
consumer o f the goods whose prices have risen. Intra-household distribution is not considered 
here.
The enterprise channel refers to the effect o f trade reform on firm s’ profits and, thereby, 
on wages and employment. The effect on employment and wages o f changes in profits will 
essentially depend on the flexibility o f employment vs. wages. W here wages are more rigid, the 
adjustment will fall on employment, and vice versa. W age and employment changes, which have 
also been explored above in the case o f NAFTA, will directly impact on households’ incomes 
and thereby on poverty.
Finally, changes in trade policy will also impact on poverty via changes in tax revenues. 
Firstly, a lowering o f tariffs will lower tariff revenue, which could lead to a squeeze o f social 
expenditures, and hence increases in poverty. Secondly, openness might affect taxation since 
more mobile factors o f production cannot be easily taxed as they could move location in response 
to higher taxation. Thirdly, governments might try to offset the fall in tariff revenue through other 
forms o f taxation, in particular sales tax or VAT. These taxes could also hurt poor consumers.
Apart from these three main channels, potential links also include the effects o f trade 
reform on external shocks, short-run risk and adjustment costs. In addition, trade liberalisation 
could affect poverty also via its impact on education and human capital accumulation. 
Bourguignon and Verdier (2003) explain how external liberalisation could affect human capital 
accumulation through changes in educational behaviour. For example, an increase in the wage
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gap, as in the case o f NAFTA, could provoke positive endogenous educational responses, as 
incentives to accumulate human capital become stronger. On the other hand, an increase in 
uncertainty due to unpredictable foreign competitive pressures and external shocks could reduce 
the incentive to invest in sector-specific education as workers are more likely to move between 
sectors. Such impacts on human capital accumulation could have dynamic impacts on people’s 
earning capacity and hence future poverty levels.
However, it should be pointed out that not all o f these channels are o f equal importance 
with respect to changes in poverty. As pointed out by Reimer (2002), the factor price, income and 
employment link could have the greatest importance, given that households tend to be more 
specialised with respect to factor earnings than with regard to consumption, i.e. changes in factor 
earnings impact more strongly on poor households than changes in final goods prices.
Other aspects that should be considered when analysing the connection between trade 
liberalisation and poverty are the particular importance o f agriculture, the gender-dimension of 
poverty and the general multi-dimensionality o f poverty.
Cline (2004) points out that the agricultural sector plays a particularly important role with 
respect to poverty because most o f the poor live in rural areas, which imply that their incomes 
closely depend on agricultural prices, and because food comprises the bulk of the poor’s 
consumption basket. The loss o f employment and the fall in wages in rural areas in Central 
America as a result o f the decline in world coffee prices, and the associated negative social 
impacts, are a recent example o f the importance o f agricultural price changes (Flores et al, 2002).
In general, world agricultural prices are artificially held down and agricultural 
liberalisation that reduces or eliminates agricultural subsidies in the US, Europe and Japan could 
have important consequences, as world food prices would rise. As long as the share o f food in the 
consumption basket o f the poor is smaller than the fraction o f their income received from 
agricultural activity, the rise in agricultural prices would reduce poverty. Moreover, the 
associated fall in relative prices o f non-food products could lead to static welfare gains in 
developing countries with a comparative advantage in food.
However, the formation o f CAFTA is more likely to reduce agricultural goods prices in 
Central America where competition from US producers can be expected to depress agricultural 
prices in previously protected activities. This would have adverse consequences on rural 
employment and wages. The adverse impact on small M exican maize producers o f the 
introduction o f strong competitive pressures from Iowa corn farmers that followed NAFTA 
(Taylor, 2002) highlights the comparative advantage o f US staples production and points to the 
potential adverse impacts that CAFTA could have on farmers in Central America. In addition, 
high transaction costs and a lack o f access to capital could exclude the rural poor from the 
potential benefits o f CAFTA and exacerbate poverty (Taylor, 2002). Therefore, in analysing 
poverty impacts o f preferential trade agreements, the agreement’s terms on agricultural goods, 
the situation o f the rural poor and the potential impact on food prices need to be closely analysed.
The gender-dimension o f poverty should also be considered. As pointed out by the UNDP 
(2003), trade liberalisation could increase particularly female employment, as female-intensive 
sectors are more likely to expand. Moreover, greater competition associated with openness could
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lead employers to look for more flexible sources of labour, which could also benefit women. On 
the other hand, intra-household distributions are usually biased against women who often have to 
bear relatively more o f the adjustment costs associated with trade reform.
Finally, poverty should be thought of as a multi-dimensional phenomenon and a 
deprivation o f basic capabilities rather than merely as lowness o f income (Sen, 1999). Therefore, 
the connection between changes in trade reform and poverty needs to address not only the impact 
o f trade liberalisation on incomes but also on people’s opportunities and capabilities in different 
social dimensions. Therefore, a close analysis of the link between trade reform and poverty 
should not be confined to the examination o f changes in poor people’s incomes or consumption 
but should include the study of a wide variety of social indicators. An example of a framework 
for poverty analysis that goes beyond simple income poverty and takes account o f the m ulti­
dimensionality o f poverty is the W orld B ank’s Social Impact and Poverty Analysis (PSIA). The 
W orld Bank’s PSIA provides suggestions on how to evaluate social impacts o f policy reforms, 
incorporating various tools and techniques from economic and social approaches. It implies “an 
analysis of the distributional impact of policy reforms on the well-being or welfare of different 
stakeholder groups, with particular focus on the poor and vulnerable.” (World Bank) As such, the 
approach includes the analysis of income as well as non-income policy effects, and advocates the 
use of “mixed-methods” using numeric and non-numeric data and quantitative as well as 
qualitative data analysis, depending on the type o f reform.
However, in practice most empirical studies of the connection between trade liberalisation 
and poverty focus only on economic aspects of poverty, such as changes in income or 
expenditure. Nevertheless, such studies can provide important information about the trade- 
poverty nexus, especially since the impact of changes in trade policy will depend on specific 
country characteristics, such as a country’s production patterns and endowments. Therefore, 
empirical studies on individual countries, rather than cross-sectional studies, could be particularly 
insightful.
Empirical studies that aim to quantify the poverty effect of trade reform are currently an 
area of intense research. Reimer (2002) summarises and classifies a large number of empirical 
studies on trade liberalisation and poverty according to their methodology. His survey divides the 
studies into four main categories: cross-country regression, partial-equilibrium/cost-of-living 
analysis, general-equilibrium simulation, and two-step micro-macro synthesis. These different 
approaches include both “bottom-down” approaches, which mainly build on econometric 
analyses o f household expenditure data and emphasise the heterogeneity o f individual , and “top- 
down” approaches, which are based on CGE models and usually use the representative household 
assumption from microeconomic theory. The general conclusion o f Reim er’s survey is that the 
connection between trade and poverty needs to be informed by both of these approaches. In fact, 
the last of his methodological categories, the two-step micro-macro simulations, aim at 
combining the two.
Using six household surveys spanning the period between 1989 and 2000, N icita (2004) 
makes use of econometric analysis for an ex-post estimation of the impact of trade reform on the 
welfare of M exican households. In his study trade effects are first translated into price and wage 
changes, which are then plugged into a farm-household model to estimate the effect on
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households’ welfare. He finds that trade liberalization in M exico had the direct effect o f reducing 
poverty by about 3 percent.
Using a CGE model, Morley and Diaz-Bonilla (2004) simulate the impact o f M exico’s 
trade liberalisation and also find that poverty declined as a result. However, they also find large 
differences between urban and rural workers. Agricultural workers are hurt due to the real 
appreciation o f the exchange rate and rural poverty increases. Extreme poverty also increases, 
given that most extreme poverty is found in rural households.
Counterfactual CGE and microsimulation studies for the CAFTA countries show similar 
results. Sauma and Sanchez (2004) find that their trade liberalisation scenarios in Costa Rica lead 
to small reductions in poverty, owing to the positive employment effects. Similarly, the increase 
in employment would also lead to poverty reductions in the Dominican Republic (Aristy, 2004), 
El Salvador (Acevedo, 2004) and Honduras (Cuesta and Sanchez, 2004).
Sánchez (2005) computes a similar CGE model which is based in the 1997 situation. He 
shows details for separate policies o f import liberalization and export promotion, as separate 
policies and also as a joint effect. With a model for each country, he is able to replicate the results 
that the liberalization that Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras produced during these past 
years. In general, poverty is reduced, but inequality increases. External shocks that push the 
exchange rate down, not only hurt exports, but also widen the gap between rich and poor, 
especially in Costa Rica and moderately in El Salvador. Also, if  Costa Rica did not depreciate its 
currency during these past years, poverty would have been larger, particularly in rural areas, 
according to the simulation that combines liberalization and appreciating external shocks. In El 
Salvador the external shocks make consumption o f local products cheaper and so poverty reduces 
slightly. Only when remittances are considered, poverty and distribution improve, but at the 
expense o f the so called “remittances disease” that the author exposes. Another conclusion o f this 
work is that Costa Rica was able to profit from liberalization because o f higher productivity and 
qualifications o f its working force, which made possible that poverty reduced since the base year 
considered.
A study by Paunovic (2004) on the fiscal implications o f CAFTA sheds light on possible 
impacts o f trade reform through the tax revenue channel described above. The study finds that the 
loss o f revenue through the reduction o f tariffs and indirect taxes o f imports is likely to outweigh 
the positive revenue effect through the increase in the volume o f imports, resulting in a net loss of 
fiscal revenue. W hile in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua net losses are 
estimated to not exceed 0.4% of GDP by the end o f the transition period, Honduras could have 
serious fiscal losses due to CAFTA, up to 0.83% by the end o f the transition period. In fact, in 
Honduras fiscal losses could reach almost five percent o f the tax revenue already in the first year 
o f the Agreement.
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V. MICRO SIMULATIONS OF THE EFFECT OF LIBERALIZATION
A microsimulation is made to study the effect o f an external shock, specifically the impact of 
liberalization, on income distribution. Since some sectors are expected to grow, while others 
decrease, it is relevant to analyze the global impact and compare the situations both before and 
after the liberalization. This technique is based on household surveys information, where the 
income o f the families is modified in different amounts, positive or negative, depending on the 
sector their members work in, so that poverty and inequality measures for both situations before 
and after the ‘shock’ can be compared.
The surveys used are for Honduras in 2002, Costa Rica in 2001 and El Salvador 2001 
compiled by BADEINSO at ECLAC. The size o f the asymmetric sectorial shocks on 
employment and wages are brought in from the paper presented by Sánchez (2005). This study 
uses a macro and micro approach, through a CGE model and micro simulations to replicate the 
liberalization occurred in Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador since 1997. This study considers 
several situations. In each o f these alternatives, two events are simulated and its effects are 
combined:
• The change in employment in four industries: Agriculture, Manufacturing, 
Construction and Services
• The change in average wage in these economic sectors
These changes are simulated through changes in the job income o f each person. Then, the 
family income is calculated based on the new distribution o f income, where other sources of 
income are added, like remittances. The income o f the personnel on domestic service is not 
considered. Finally, the per capita household income is calculated. Since the variation on income 
is applied to individual incomes, and more precisely, on the main job income, the calculations are 
more accurate than if  total household income is altered, no matter if  there are more than one 
income-earner working on a different industry which is not altered, or if  income comes from 
other sources apart from the sector that is being ‘shocked’.
The chosen ‘shocks’ or events considered for simulation in this study, following Sánchez 
(2005), are:
• Ref3: Combination o f a liberalization on imports through a reduction in 50% tax 
on imports, and liberalization on exports through a reduction o f 50% on export 
taxes.
• Ref4: This is Ref3 plus external shocks that appreciate the real exchange rate 
through 25% increase in external saving, 25% increase in remittances and 5% 
decrease in world prices for exported products.
• Ref5: This is Ref3 plus a nominal depreciation o f 2.5%.
• Ref6: This is Ref3 plus a 5% increase in FDI and factor productivity in exporting 
industries. This is called the productivity shock.
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• Ref7: This is Ref3 plus a 5% increase in qualification o f the labour force, i.e. some 
non qualified employees now become qualified.
• Ref8: This is Ref6 and Ref7 together.
In each case, the variation on employment levels for all the four industries considered is 
combined with the change in average wages in the same sectors. The unemployment resulting 
from the shock is simulated by changing the main job income o f certain employees, working on 
the chosen sector, to zero. These employees are chosen randomly. Then, from the increased pool 
of unemployed, the people are again chosen randomly to be hired on the jobs created in other 
industries. The following step is to reduce or increase the wages in each industry considered. The 
average percentage variation is applied to all employees according to the impact on the industry 
they are working in.
The results are presented in graphs using kernel distributions for the per capita income 
calculated as described before. Only the lowest values o f the income variable are presented so 
that the reader may have a clear picture o f the changes in the thickest part o f the distribution. The 
sample values are weighted according to the expansion factor from the survey, so that the 
expanded income variable may represent more closely the population distribution.
The Table 1 provides the results from Sánchez (2005). These impacts are then applied to 
the 2001 or 2002 surveys. The main limitation o f this technique is that the impacts on 
employment and wages are a result o f the simulation of the liberalization occurred in the late 
nineties and may not be the same after the CAFTA-DR. If  the shocks considered can anyway 
seem feasible for the following years, this exercise is worth doing. Another limitation is that the 
poverty impact also depends on the price of the basic products contained in the consumption 
basket. Here, the lower prices o f the imported goods compensate with the higher relative prices 
for the exportable products, so that the poverty lines do not change. If it is possible to switch 
from more expensive products to lower price goods in basic consumption, then this exercise is 
too pessimistic.
Table 1
M icrosim ulations for com m ercia l liberalization on em ploym ent and w ages
(Percentage variations)
Item Honduras
Ref3 Ref4 Ref 5 Ref6 Ref7 Ref8
Employment
Agriculture 0,8 -2,1 -12,3 7,6 3,4 10,8
Manufacturing 1,9 1,6 0,9 4,3 10,1 12,7
Construction 2,0 -0,7 -17,4 10,2 4,9 13,6
Services 0,7 0,7 -1,6 3,6 4,8 7,7
Wages
Agriculture 0,2 -0,3 -1,2 0,8 1,0 1,5
Manufacturing 1,4 2,1 9,5 2,1 -11,5 -11,2
Construction -0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,0 -0,1 -0,1
Services 0,4 0,4 0,5 1,8 -9,7 -8,9
Source: Sánchez (2005)
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The results that Sánchez (2005) found for three o f the Central American countries, 
employment would rise in Cost Rica, El Salvador and Honduras, especially in the first one, if  
import liberalization took place together with and exports promotion. But it does not reach even a 
2% increase. The income level would rise in El Salvador by 10.2%, but only 0.4% in Honduras; 
and decrease in Costa Rica by 0.2%. If  also external shocks that would appreciate the exchange 
rate occurred, 10 Costa Rica would be the only favoured country in terms o f income level. The 
agricultural sector is especially harmed in the presence o f appreciation o f the currency, both in 
employment and income levels. Depreciation is only beneficial for El Salvador.
In Honduras, productivity increases fuel the benefits from liberalization, fostering 
employment and also rising wages. Construction is the most favoured sector in employment 
creation. But if  the country could get more qualified workers, manufacturing would be the 
industry where most jobs would be created. Anyway, this may also mean decreasing wages for 
them. W hen combining the effects o f higher productivity and higher qualification for the 
workers, this latter effect prevails.
Graph 1. Per capita income kernel distribution for Honduras. Shocks Ref3 Ref4 and Ref5
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10 Appreciation caused for example by increase in external saving and/or remittances.
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The Graph 1 present the results for the shocks Ref3, Ref4 and Ref5 for Honduras, and 
Graph 2 presents the results for combined effects in employment and wages for Ref6, Ref7 and 
Ref8. It is desired that the distribution moved to the right so that lees people have lower income. 
In the Honduras results, the income distribution in all cases seems to concentrate more on the left 
side after the shock, except for the positive shock productivity. This means that poverty increases. 
Only on Ref5 and Ref6 the headcount poverty index decreases, as can be seen on Table2. This 
means that when analysing the joint effect o f employment creation and wage changes on the 
income distribution, only the productivity increase or de devaluation can contribute to poverty 
reduction.
The inequality is calculated with the Atkinson index, where the ‘poverty aversion 
parameter’ e is considered=1. The results can be seen on Table 2 and show that inequality 
decreases only when the workforce becomes more qualified. This may be because the wages of 
the manufacturing industry, which has one o f the highest wage levels, get lower. More important, 
the liberalization by itself contributes to the highest increases in inequality, only decreased when 
productivity increases or the workers attain higher qualifications.
Table 2














* Atkinson index is A(e), w here  e is taken here as e=1 
Source: Cepal
Graph 2. Per capita income kernel distribution for Honduras. Shocks Ref6 Ref7 and Ref8
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Changes in trade policy, such as the formation of preferential trade agreements, can yield 
substantial benefits for the countries involved. However, simple ex-ante predictions about 
changes in welfare from such trade reforms do not seem possible and, more importantly, even in 
the case of overall welfare gains, changes in welfare differ according to region and sector and 
across individuals. Certain groups will almost inevitably lose from trade reform. W hile in theory 
losers could then be compensated so as to improve everyone’s welfare, in practice governments 
are usually incapable o f distinguishing winners from losers precisely and without cost. Moreover, 
lumps-sum transfers for redistribution are typically not possible and governments have to rely on 
distortionary taxes and subsidies with associated dead-weight losses to the economy.
W ith respect to poverty the connection to trade reform is ambiguous. W hile trade could 
lead to poverty reduction via a positive impact on growth, trade reform will by no means 
automatically lead to poverty reduction. Therefore, “trade liberalization policies should not be 
viewed as a reliable mechanism for generating self-sustaining growth and reducing poverty, let 
alone achieving other positive human development outcomes” (UNDP, 2003). Instead, it is 
important to think about complementary policies in order to reduce poverty and the 
implementation of social safety nets to minimise adverse impacts of trade reform on certain 
population groups, in particular in the agricultural sector.
A study revealed that poverty decreases less in there is a high level of initial inequality. 
This could have a relationship with the difficulty of the extreme poor to gain from the increase in 
the GDP, typically the low productivity agricultural sector. An explanation could be the difficulty 
to attain human or physical capital, for example due to credit rationing problems. If  growth is due 
to new exports led by liberalization agreements, it would be interesting to test whether only 
middle or high income sectors tend profit from the new trade agreements or if  nothing can be said 
about how inclusive can be the export led growth that is expected.
The micro simulations calculated show how the income distribution may move to the left, 
causing poverty increases. For Honduras, higher productivity seems to be the best strategy. 
Inequality can increase with liberalization and is only when it is accompanied by higher 
productivity or higher qualifications for the workforce when this ‘side effect’ o f liberalization 
may be neutralized. Moreover, higher productivity is the sole alternative to raise both 
employment and wages in all sectors. Also, it would lower poverty by almost 2%. On the other 
hand, a real appreciation of the currency caused by increase in remittances, external saving, or 
decrease in world prices for exported products, may increase poverty.
Anyhow, it seems that complementary policies may be of great help. These could include 
educating and training workers to facilitate their reallocation from declining to growing industries 
and the development of infrastructure to improve access to markets. Moreover, rather than just 
serving as a means of postponing shocks, transition periods established through the gradual 
phase-out o f tariffs in sensitive sectors should be used to provide workers and businesses with 
technical assistance and slowly adapt them to the competitive pressures. Yet, despite such efforts,
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losers from trade reform will emerge and social safety nets will be necessary to cushion adverse 
income shocks. Such safety nets could take the form o f cash-transfers, such as unemployment 
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ANNEX
Graph A1. Impacts on per cápita income for Honduras alter shocks Ref3, Ref4 and Ref5
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Graph A2. Impacts on per cápita income for Honduras alter shocks Ref6, Ref7 and Ref8
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